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COERCION AND MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT"
BRUCE J. WINICK

t

I. INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING COERCION

Any discussion of coerced mental health treatment must begin with a definition of the term "coercion." In its most basic meaning, the term coercion
connotes force or duress, or at least the threat of force. In the context under
consideration, civil commitment and court-ordered treatment are the paradigm
cases. But coercion extends beyond the use of overt legal compulsion. Coercion may occur when individuals experience a loss of control over decisions
that they would like to make for themselves through threats, pressure, persuasion, manipulation, or deception on the part of another Much coercion occurs in the shadow of the law. People impaired by mental illness may be
especially vulnerable to suggestiveness and to official and familial pressures
that those without such impairment would be better able to resist? Clinicians
and family members often pressure patients with mental illness to accept voluntary admission to the hospital or needed treatment, sometimes threatening to
invoke civil commitment, court-mandated treatment, and even criminal arrest
if they decline.' In addition, in the mental health context, as in other legal
contexts--contract law and plea bargaining, for example-proposals or offers
may sometimes be regarded as coercive.'

* Copyright © 1997 by Bruce J. Winick. This article was prepared for a Symposium on
Coercion and Exploitation at the University of Denver College of Law held on March 14-15,
1997, and presented to the Bioethics and Health Law Working Group at the University of Miami
School of Law in April of 1997. I appreciate the helpful comments of colleagues at the
presentations, and the research assistance of Alina Perez, Alphus Harris, and Tricia Shackelford.
t Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, Florida. A.B.,
Brooklyn College, 1965; J.D., New York University, 1968.
2. See John S. Carroll, Consent to Mental Health Treatment: A Theoretical Analysis of Coercion, Freedom, and Control, 9 BEHAv. Sc. & L. 129, 131-36 (1991) (analyzing types of coercion applied in the mental health process).
3.

BRUCE J. WiNICK, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH

LAW 401 (1997).
4. See, e.g., SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 179-80
(3d ed. 1985); RALPH SLOvENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 202-04 (1973); John Monahan et
al., Coercion to Inpatient Treatment: Initial Results and Implications for Assertive Treatment in
the Community, in COERCION AND AGGRESSIVE COMMUNITY TREATMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN
MENTAL HEALTH LAW 251 (Deborah L. Dennis & John Monahan eds., 1996) [hereinafter A NEW
FRONTIER]; WINICK, supra note 3, at 395-96 n.108; Janet A. Gilboy & John R. Schmidt, "Volun-

tary" Hospitalizationof the Mentally Ill, 66 Nw. U. L. REv. 429, 433 (1971); David B. Wexler,
The Structure of Civil Commitment: Patterns,Pressures,and Interactions in Mental Health Legislation, 7 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 1, 5 (1983); Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary
Hospitalization:A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch, 14 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 169, 209-10 (1991).
5. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 202-41 (1987); Alan Wertheimer, A Philosophic
Examination of Coercion for Mental Health Issues, I1 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 239, 244-46 (1993);
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The term coercion is not an entirely descriptive one, and it does not have
an entirely objective and universally applicable meaning. Rather, it is a "contextually dependent, moralized phenomenon." In many respects, coercion has
a significant normative content. Coercion is a pejorative label that judges invoke to condemn behavior that they find objectionable or to permit the invalidation of choices that they deem unfair or unreasonable in the circumstances."
Moreover, coercion may have a significant subjective component. Although the law tends to define coercion based exclusively on the actions of the
person who applies pressure to another, ignoring the subjective response of the
recipient, this exclusive focus on the coercer seems artificial. The same actions
may be perceived as coercive by one patient, but as not coercive by another.
Significant numbers of patients who are involuntarily committed to psychiatric
hospitals perceive their commitment to have been voluntary, whereas significant numbers of voluntary patients perceive coercion in the admission process.8 Thus patient perceptions of coercion are often incongruent with their
official legal status. Furthermore, patient perceptions of coercion often differ
from the perceptions of others who observe the patient in the hospital admission process, such as clinical staff and family members.9
What constitutes coercion, in short, may lie largely in the eye of the beholder." This subjective character of coercion does not argue that the law
should avoid reliance on an objective definition of the term. People who are
coerced in a legal sense may mistakenly believe that they were not coerced,
and those whose actions were not coerced as a matter of law may feel coerced. But the law should take account of what makes people feel coerced in
fashioning legal standards and procedures in this area.

Bruce J.Winick, Harnessing the Power of the Bet: Wagering with the Government as a Mechanism for Social and Individual Change, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737 (1991) (discussing behavioral
contracting).
6. WERITEIMER, supra note 5, at 206; Monahan et al., supra note 4, at 13; Charles W.
Lidz etal., Perceived Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission, 52 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY
1034 (1995); Wertheimer, supra note 5; Charles W. Lidz et al., The Validity of Mental Patients'
Accounts of Coercion Related Behaviors in the Hospital Admission Process (1996) (unpublished
manuscript on fie with the author).
7. See David B. Wexler, Reflections on the Regulation of Behavior Modification in Institutional Settings, 17 ARiz. L. REV. 132, 133 (1975); Bruce J.Winick, Legal Limitations on Correctional Therapy and Research, 65 MINN. L. REV. 331, 391-92 (1981). For a discussion of the normative nature of coercion, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALrrY OF FREEDOM 148-57 (1986);
WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 211-17; Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1443, 1446 (1989).
8. Nancy S. Bennett et al., Inclusion, Motivation, and Good Faith: The Morality of Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission, 11 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 295 (1993); Deborah L. Dennis & John
Monahan, Introduction, in A NEW FRONTIR, supra note 4, at 3; William P. Gardner et al., Two
Scales for Measuring Patients' Perceptionsfor Coercion During Mental Hospital Admission, 11
BEHAV. Sd. & L. 307 (1993); Gilboy & Schmidt, supra note 4, at 433; Virginia A. Hiday et al.,
Patient Perceptions of Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission, 20 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
(1997); John Monahan et al., Coercion and Commitment: UnderstandingInvoluntary Mental Hospital Admission, 18 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 249 (1995); Monahan, supra note 4, at 23-27; Anne
Rogers, Coercion and Voluntary Admission: An Examination of Psychiatric Patient Views, 11
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 259 (1993).
9. Bennett et al., supra note 8, at 300-01; Gardner et al., supra note 8, at 308; Hiday et al.,
supra note 8; Monahan, supra note 8, at 252.
10. See infra Part VI (discussing research on patient perceptions of coercion).
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Absent fraud or mistake, when people subjectively experience their choices as voluntary, the issue of coercion ordinarily will not be raised. People who
do not feel coerced are unlikely to commence legal proceedings to complain
about the actions of others that might have contributed to their choice, nor to
seek judicially to void choices they have made. When people feel coerced,
however, they are more likely to complain about it, and it is more probable
that judges will need to resolve the issue.
In cases in'
which patients raise the issue of coercion, courts are faced
with the question of whether to characterize the actions of governmental officials or others as coercive or to characterize patient choices as coerced. In
such cases courts will need to decide that either there was coercion or there
was not. Although courts therefore will view coercion as a dichotomous inquiry-in which the patient is either coerced or not-coercion can be better understood as existing on a continuum-"from friendly persuasion to interpersonal pressure, to control of resources to use of force."" Very few choices in
life are wholly free of at least some degree of coercion.' 2 In addition to the
compulsion of the law, a variety of economic, social, familial, occupational,
and psychological pressures inevitably impinge on individual decision making,
sometimes leading individuals to experience their choices as coerced.
There are degrees of coercion falling along a continuum, and where the
law chooses to place the dividing line between coercion and voluntariness is
essentially a normative judgment." Once this normative character of the concept of coercion is recognized, we should strive to identify and weigh the various values that might be affected by differing legal standards defining the
category and procedures governing its determination. These values include
respect for individual autonomy and self-determination, our notions of the
limits of governmental power over the individual, the desire to protect individuals from harm or unfair treatment, and in the case of medical and mental
health treatment, the desire to foster the efficacy of such treatment. This last
concern-the therapeutic-focuses attention on the relationship between perceived coercion and treatment outcome, a question that remains substantially
unexplored empirically.'4 Although our knowledge concerning this relationship remains incomplete, psychological theory would suggest that coercion
may undermine treatment success and that its opposite-voluntary
choice-may serve to promote it. After briefly examining the asserted justifications for coercion in the mental health context and considering some special
problems raised by the application of coercion standards to the situation of
institutionalized patients, this article will analyze this relationship and explore

11. Ronald J. Diamond, Coercion and Tenacious Treatment in the Community: Applications
to the Real World, in A NEw FRONTIER, supra note 4, at 55. For a discussion of coercion as involving a continuum, see JOEL FEINBERO, HARM To SELF 255-56 (1989); see also Robert D.
Miller, The Continuum of Coercion: Constitutionaland Clinical Considerationsin the Treatment
of Mentally Disordered Persons, 74 DENY. U. L. REv. 1169, 1172 (1997).
12. Winick, supra note 5, at 770; see also Robert D. Miller, supra note 11, at 1170-71.
13. Id.
14.

BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH

TREATMENT

(1997);

WINICK, supra note 3, at 78; see Virginia A. Hiday, Coercion in Civil Commitment: Process,
Preferences and Outcome, 15 INT'L J.L. & PsYCHIATRY 359, 359 (1992).
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how legal rules governing coercion and its determination, and the application
of those rules, might affect therapeutic values.
1H. WHEN THE LAW PERMITS INVOLUNTARY HOSPITALIZATION AND
COERCIVE TREATMENT

All jurisdictions permit the civil commitment to psychiatric hospitals of
those suffering from mental illness. 5 Commitment of those dangerous to
themselves or others is a traditional exercise of the state's police power. 6
Commitment of those who are incompetent to engage in rational hospitalization decisions for themselves and who otherwise would be gravely disabled is
an application of the state's historic parens patriae power. 7 Although voluntary hospitalization is encouraged, those who refuse it and who meet statutory
criteria may be hospitalized involuntarily. 8
When patients are subjected to civil commitment, and sometimes even
when they are not, they may be treated on an involuntary basis. Although the
law has increasingly recognized a qualified right of mental patients to refuse
various types of mental health treatment, 9 the courts have recognized situations in which the government's interests in compelled treatment may outweigh the individual's right to refuse it.2' For example, when an institutionalized patient or prisoner is dangerous to institutional staff, other patients, or inmates as a result of mental illness, the state may involuntarily administer psychotropic medication as long as it is medically appropriate for the individual
and (in non-prison contexts) the least intrusive means of dealing with the
problem.2' Similarly, courts have permitted forced treatment under the state's
parens patriae power when mental illness has rendered patients incompetent to
make treatment decisions for themselves.22 Another example involves criminal defendants found to be incompetent to stand trial who may be administered involuntary treatment designed to restore and maintain their competence,
as long as it is medically appropriate and the least intrusive means of accomplishing this goal.23
15. See, e.g., BRAKEL Er AL., supra note 4, at 34, 76-81 (table 2.1); 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN,
MENTAL DISABILITY LAw: CivIL AND CRIMINAL (1989); Note, Developments in the Law-Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190 (1974). For an analysis of the mental illness requirement for civil commitment, see WmNCK, supra note 3, at 93-199.
16. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 375; 1 PERLIN supra note 15, at 37-45; WINICK,
supra note 3, at 162-66; Joseph M. Livermore et a., On the Justificationsfor Civil Commitment,
117 U. PA. L. REv. 75 (1968) (discussing the public policy justifications for involuntary commitment); Note, supra note 15, at 1222-45.
17. See BRAKEL Er AL., supra note 4, at 428-29; 1 PERLIN, supra note 15, at 37-45; WNICK,
supra note 3, at 166-71; Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction
Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REv. 15, 16-18 (1991); Note, supra note 15, at 120722.
18. See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 24; WINICK, supra note 3, at 201-13.
19. See WINICK, supra note 14.
20. Id. at 269-309.
21. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135-36 (1992) (dictum); Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210, 225 (1990); WINIcK, supra note 14, at 285-88, 294-308.
22. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 845 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cit. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); WiNICK, supra note 14, at 289-94.
23. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 127; WINICK, supra note 14, at 276-83; Bruce J. Winick, Psycho-
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In addition to contexts involving institutionalized mental patients and
criminal offenders, coercive mental health treatment has increasingly been applied in the community.14 Such treatment has been mandated as part of involuntary outpatient commitment, preventive commitment, conditional release,
and as a condition of parole, probation, or diversion from the criminal process.' Also, court-ordered treatment may be imposed in a variety of criminal
and family court contexts. 6 Other than to offer the above brief outline of
when the law authorizes involuntary psychiatric hospitalization and mental
health treatment, this article does not attempt an analysis of the conditions
under which coercion in the mental health context should be justified."'
III. LEGAL STANDARDS OF COERCION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR
SATISFACTION BY THOSE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS

A number of situations thus exist in which involuntary commitment is
permitted and in which clinicians in public facilities and in the community will
be authorized to administer mental health treatment coercively. In those circumstances in which the law authorizes coercive mental health intervention,
the usual requirements of the informed consent doctrine will not need to be
followed. Indeed, in these situations, clinicians will rarely discuss hospitalization and treatment options with their patients, but will make treatment decisions unilaterally and order that hospitalization and treatment be imposed involuntarily, even over objection. Although some judicial and legislative clarification has occurred concerning when patients have a right to refuse treatment and when they do not, many issues remain unresolved.'
In situations in which involuntary hospitalization or coercive treatment is
not permitted, the law will need to define the concept of coercion. Typical
definitions incorporate the standard of coercion adopted in the Nuremberg
Code, requiring "the knowing consent of an individual or his legally authorized representative, so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice
without undue inducement or any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or
other form of constraint or coercion."' Patients institutionalized because of
mental illness may be particularly vulnerable to coercive pressures, and their
consent to treatment delivered within the institution cannot always be accepted
at face value. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the fact of
"

tropic Medication in the Criminal Trial Process: The Constitutionaland-TherapeuticImplications
of Riggins v. Nevada, 10 N.Y.L. Sci. J. HuM. RTS. 637, 646-51 (1993).
24. See A NEw FRONTIER, supra note 4.
25. Id.
26. For extensive treatment of this issue, see WhcK, supra note 14 (involuntary treatment);
WINICK, supra note 3, at 93-199 (involuntary hospitalization and treatment).
27. Id.
28. See WINICK, supra note 14.
29. The Medical Cases, in 1 & 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRmNALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
MILrIARY TRIBUNALS (1948), reprinted in JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS
292, 305-06 (1972). The principles set forth in the judgment of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal
in the case of United States v. Karl Brand--the trial of twenty-three German physicians for war
crimes involving experiments with prisoners of war and civilians--have come to be known as the
Nuremberg Code. See aLso 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1996) (U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services
regulations concerning the protection of human subjects).
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institutionalization per se renders treatment choices involuntary."
Prisoners face similar institutional pressures, and it is useful to consider
the related question of whether prisoners should be considered able to make
free choices. In its report entitled Research Involving Prisoners, the National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavof the
ioral Research considered "whether prisoners are, in the words
,.
.
po. er of
able
o.,.0.,,.;
Nuremberg Code, 'so situ.atedas to
choice"--that is, whether prisoners can give truly voluntary consent to participate in research.3" Some of the commissioners argued that prisons, by their
very purpose and character, make sufficiently free consent to research impossible.32 Similarly, several participants at a National Minority Conference on
Human Experimentation held under the auspices of the National Commission
objected in principle to the notion of truly voluntary consent by prisoners.33
The National Commission, however, ultimately rejected the idea that prisons
are so inherently coercive that voluntary consent is impossible, and concluded
that at least some prison research could be undertaken with appropriate safeguards.34 The Commission proposed a number of requirements to ensure "a
high degree of voluntariness on the part of the prospective participants," including "adequate living conditions, provisions for effective redress of grievances, separation of research participation from parole considerations, and
public scrutiny."3 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services regulations, initially adopted as a result of the Commission's work, include an additional protection for prisoners subjected to biomedical and behavioral research. The regulation requires an assurance that parole boards not take into
account a prisoner's participation in such research in making parole decisions,
and that prisoners be "clearly informed in advance that participation in the
research will have no effect on his or her parole."'
In the Kaimowitz Michigan psychosurgery case,37 the court considered
the impact on voluntariness of institutionalization and of the inducement created when release is tied to consent. The court held that involuntarily confined
mental patients are unable as a matter of law to consent to experimental psychosurgery. The court's analysis has broad implications for the ability of all

30. The analysis that follows is drawn in part from my discussion of the requirement of
voluntariness under the informed consent doctrine contained in WINICK, supra note 14, at 363-68.
31. NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH INVOLVING PRISONERS 5 (1976) [hereinafter RESEARCH].
32. Roy Branson, PrisonResearch: National Commission Says "No, Unless.. .", HASTINGS
CENTER REP. Feb. 1977, at 15, 17 (quoting remarks of Commissioner King).
33. RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 42, 44. This was also the view of the American Correctional Association. See American Correctional Ass'n, Position Statement: The Use of Prisoners
and Detainees as Subjects of Human Experimentation, Feb. 20, 1976, in RESEARCH, supra note
31, at 22-1 to 22-2 app.
34. Larry I. Palmer, Biomedical and Behavioral Research on Prisoners:Public Policy Issues
in Human Experimentation,in RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 14-21 app.; see Branson, supra note
32, at 16.
35. RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 16.
36. 45 C.F.R. § 46.305(a)(6) (1996).
37. Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW (D. Mich. July 10,
1973), reprinted in ALEXANDER D. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 902, 913-14 (1974).
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institutionalized mental patients to provide informed consent, and therefore
deserves careful analysis. The court stated that:
Although an involuntarily detained mental patient may have sufficient
I.Q. to intellectually comprehend his circumstances... the very
nature of his incarceration diminishes the capacity to consent to psychosurgery.
The fact of institutional confinement has special force in undermining the capacity of the mental patient to make a competent decision on this issue, even though he be intellectually competent to do
SO.
It is impossible for an involuntarily detained mental patient to be
free of ulterior forms of restraint or coercion when his very release
from the institution may depend upon his cooperating with institutional authorities and giving consent to experimental surgery.
Involuntarily confined mental patients live in an inherently coercive institutional environment. Indirect and subtle psychological coercion has a profound effect upon the patient population.... They are
not able to voluntarily give informed consent because of the inherent
inequality of their position.38
The sweeping approach of Kaimowitz, however, has not been followed by
other courts. The Kaimowitz court sought to limit its holding to experimental
psychosurgery by stating that consent could be given to conventionally accepted procedures.39 The logic, however, of the court's approach to coercion goes
considerably beyond experimental treatment.
Although the Kaimowitz court may have reached the right result on the
facts of that case,' the potential breadth of the court's holding concerning the
effects of institutionalization and the promise of release on the capacity to give
informed consent could give rise to absurd and constitutionally dubious results.
Institutionalization may substantially diminish the ability of some patients to
decide freely on therapy, and the lure of release or of avoiding hospitalization
may be so potent that, for at least some patients, refusal to consent is virtually
impossible. These factors, however, should not preclude all patients from
being considered capable of making these decisions voluntarily. If institutionalization per se diminishes decision-making abilities so that patients are incompetent to elect psychosurgery, how can patients be considered competent
to make other important decisions? Can they decide to have elective surgery
or other medical treatment when needed, to choose particular recreational or
therapeutic opportunities, or to agree to accept certain conditions of conditional release? Moreover, if the prospect of release renders confined individuals

38. Kaimowitz,
39. Kaimowitz,
40. See Robert
REP. , Feb. 1975, at

No. 73-19434-AW, slip op. at 25-29; BROOKS, supra note 37, at 913-15.
No. 73-19434-AW, slip op. at 40; BROOKS, supra note 37, at 920.
Burt, Why We Should Keep Prisoners From The Doctors, HASTINGS CENTER
25.
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incompetent to elect psychosurgery, how can patients be permitted to elect the
variety of other hospital programs that are likely to result in early release?
The absurdity of a per se rule based upon the impact of institutionalization or the lure of release is demonstrated by its extraordinarily sweeping effect. An example drawn from the analogous context of the prison illustrates
the difficulties with the Kaimowitz approach. A common example of use of the
early release lure to modify prisoner behavior is the virtually universal practice
of providing "good time" credit. As the Supreme Court noted in McGinnis v.
Royster,1 "the granting of good-time credit toward parole eligibility takes
into account a prisoner's rehabilitative performance." 4 The state statute involved in Royster authorized such good time credit "for good conduct and
efficient and willing performance of duties assigned."43 Under a U.S. Bureau
of Prisons rule, an award of "extra good time" may be made for, among other
things, "[v]oluntary acceptance and satisfactory performance of an unusually
hazardous assignment."" Under the Kaimowitz approach, these common and
largely unobjectionable features of prison life would be deemed coercive.
Although the lure of release from institutional confinement may make the
voluntary choices made by patients in favor of treatment suspect, it would be a
mistake to regard all such choices as inherently coerced even though they
predictably may bring about earlier release from the hospital.
In the analogous situation of plea bargaining, the courts have rejected the
notion that the opportunity or even the assurance of a shorter sentence necessarily renders a guilty plea involuntary. In Brady v. United States,5 the defendant attacked the validity of his guilty plea, arguing that it was entered to
avoid the possibility of the death penalty. Under the statute involved, the death
penalty could be imposed following a jury determination of guilty but could
not be imposed when a defendant waived trial and pled guilty. Stressing that
"[t]he voluntariness of Brady's plea can be determined only by considering all
of the relevant circumstances surrounding it,"' the Court rejected the coercion claim:
Even if we assume that Brady would not have pleaded guilty except
for the death penalty provision. .. ,this assumption merely identifies
the penalty provision as a "but for" cause of his plea. That the statute
caused the plea in this sense does not necessarily prove that the plea
was coerced and invalid as an involuntary act....
Of course, the agents of the State may not produce a plea by
actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing
the will of the defendant. But nothing of the sort is claimed in this

41. 410 U.S. 263 (1973).
42. McGinnis, 410 U.S. at 271.
43. Id. at 266-67 n.5 (quoting Royster v. McGinnis, 332 F. Supp. 973, 974-75 (S.D.N.Y.
1971)).
44. 28 C.F.R. § 523.16 (1996); see also 28 C.F.R. § 2.60(a), (b) (1996) (rule of U.S. Parole
Commission permitting advancement of presumptive release date for "superior program achievement" in "educational, vocational, industry, or counselling programs").
45. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
46. Brady, 397 U.S. at 749.
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case.... Brady's claim is of a different sort: that it violates the Fifth
Amendment to influence or encourage a guilty plea by opportunity or
promise of leniency and that a guilty plea is coerced and invalid if
influenced by the fear of a possible higher penalty for the crime
charged if a conviction is obtained after the State is put to its proof.
We decline to hold, however, that a guilty plea is compelled and
invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the
defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser
penalty ... . '
Not all pressures that succeed in inducing a plea will be deemed coercive.
The Brady Court adopted as its standard of voluntariness the rule that a guilty
plea "must stand unless induced by threats ... misrepresentation . . . , or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper," such as bribes.' The
Court thus recognized that while certain plea offers could be coercive, an offer
of leniency alone, however enticing, would not be deemed coercive. Even an
offer that is difficult to refuse will be permitted absent improper threats or
promises or some form of misrepresentation. Under the standard adopted by
the Court, "a plea of guilty is not invalid merely because entered to avoid the
9
possibility of a death penalty."
If avoidance of the possibility of a death sentence is not so inherently
coercive as to invalidate a guilty plea, then it is difficult to see how the possibility or promise of early release from the hospital could be considered so
inherently coercive as to invalidate a patient's choice of therapy. There was no
suggestion in Brady that the prosecutor acted in bad faith, using his charging
discretion improperly to lodge a baseless charge against Brady of an offense
carrying the death penalty in order to engineer a guilty plea. Offering to dismiss a baseless charge in exchange for a guilty plea would have been an "improper" promise, and hence coercive.' Similarly, if the conditions of institutional confinement that would be avoided by the agreement of a hospitalized
patient to accept treatment are inconsistent with the minimum standards mandated by the Constitution,"1 an offer of potential release also would constitute
an improper promise that would be coercive under the Brady standard.

47. Id. at 750-5 1.
48. Id. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cit. 1957)).
Brady did not actually involve plea bargaining. The statute under which Brady was charged made
the death penalty unavailable in the case of a guilty plea. The pressure that Brady asserted had
induced his plea was a product of the statutory scheme itself. The Supreme Court, however, subsequently applied the Brady standard in the context of plea bargaining. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978). Indeed, Brady's concept of offers or proposals as coercive only when
improper has emerged as a general legal approach to considering when offers are coercive. See
WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 172, 267-68, 287, 301, 308; Winick, supra note 5, at 770 & n.107;
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174-76 (1981) (standard of duress limited to
physical compulsion or improper threats).
49. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755.
50. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd sub nom. Wyatt
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Either case-the offer to dismiss a baseless charge or to remove legally
inadequate conditions of confinement in exchange for a guilty plea-would
constitute a coercive offer which would render unenforceable the defendant's
plea made in response. Such an offer is objectionable because the conditions
from which the individual is offered relief if he or she accepts the proposal are
themselves improper. If rejected, the individual would be worse off than he or
she has a right to be. The offer thus violates the individual's moralized baseline, rendering the pressures it creates coercive." By contrast, if the conditions of institutional confinement are not unconstitutional or otherwise improper, the promise of future release conditioned on acceptance of treatment
would seem no different than a promise not to seek the death penalty or to
dismiss capital charges that are appropriate in the circumstances in exchange
for a guilty plea.
Of course, there may be cases in which the forces of institutionalization
render a particular patient incapable of making truly voluntary choices. And
there may be cases in which threats or promises are so potent that the particular patient's consent is virtually assured. Nevertheless, this does not mean that
institutionalization or the opportunity of early release or of avoidance of confinement renders voluntary consent impossible.
Virtually no choice is totally free of at least some degree of psychological
coercion.53 Psychologist Israel Goldiamond has performed a useful behavioral
analysis of voluntariness and coercion, defining situations of coercion and
noncoercion through the use of a contingency analysis.54 In this model, coercion is most severe when there are no genuine choices and the consequences
contingent on behavior are critical. 5 Certainly plea bargaining is coercive under this model,56 sometimes extremely so. Nevertheless, courts have accepted
the basic legitimacy of plea bargaining, deeming this degree of coercion constitutionally tolerable.57 The psychological pressures inherent in a particular
situation will not alone render choices coerced for legal purposes. It is only

52. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 5, at 210.
53. Israel Goldiamond, Protection of Human Subjects and Patients: A Social Contingency
Analysis of Distinctions Between Research and Practice,and its Implications, 4 BEHAVIORISM 1,

27 (1976) ("Coercion is not absolute; there are degrees of coercion as well as of freedom."); see
Louis L. Jaffee, Law as a System of Control, in EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBIEcrs 203,

216 (Paul A. Freund ed., 1969). For philosophical analyses of the concept of coercion, see RAZ,
supra note 7; WERTHEIMER, supra note 5; REPRESENTATION: YEARBOOK FOR THE AMERICAN
SOCIETY FOR POLMCAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 1-328 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1968); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Consent, Coercion and Hard Choices, 67 VA. L. REV. 79 (1981);
Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND METHOD 440 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al.
eds., 1969); Wertheimer, supra note 5; Alan Wertheimer, Remarks on Coercion and Exploitation,
74 DENv. U. L. REV. 889 (1997).
54. Goldiamond, supra note 53, at 20-34; Israel Goldiamond, Singling Out Behavior Modifications for Legal Regulation: Some Effects on Patient Care, Psychotherapy and Research in General, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 105, 121-25 (1975).
55. Goldiamond, supra note 53, at 23.
56. See John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CI. L. REV. 3, 12-13
(1978); Steven S. Nemerson, Coercive Sentencing, 64 MINN. L. REv. 669, 675-78 (1980).
57. See, e.g., Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 222-23 (1978); Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); Blacklede v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977). The Supreme Court
even has suggested that plea bargairiing, properly conducted, is worthy of encouragement. See
Santabello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
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when improper pressures are brought to bear that courts will find coercion.
Most patients should be deemed, in principle, capable of consenting to
even the most intrusive of treatment programs-programs that they otherwise
would have a constitutional right to refuse. Because the inherent psychological
pressures faced by institutionalized patients choosing treatment are simply not
avoidable, courts should seek only to protect against additional or related
pressures that are unfair or improper." An analogy to plea bargaining is
again useful. The inherent coerciveness of plea bargaining is mitigated by the
presence and advice of counsel during the plea bargaining process, 9 and by
the practice of giving pleas in open court where the judge is required to conduct a review of the extent of the defendant's knowledge of the rights about to
be waived and the voluntariness of their waiver.' Similar protection could
easily be fashioned in the context of consent to at least the more intrusive
forms of mental health treatment. Indeed, some type of pretreatment hearing
and independent review may be required by the guarantee of procedural due
process.6 ' With these procedural qualifications, it seems likely that courts
would uphold the validity of consent given by patients in connection with
mental health or correctional therapies. Although institutionalization and the
lure of release may provide pressures that render some choices made in response legally coerced, most patients will be able to satisfy the requirement of
voluntariness notwithstanding these pressures, and to provide informed consent
to treatment.
IV. A

THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPROACH TO COERCION

Although the pressures inherent to institutionalization or the potent lure of
release from hospital confinement will not by themselves render treatment
choices coerced, in those contexts in which the law prohibits coerced hospitalization or treatment, there is need for further clarification concerning when
persuasion and pressure to accept voluntary hospitalization or treatment cross
the line into coercion. This is not an easy line for the law to draw, particularly
in the mental health treatment context where persuasion and coping with patient resistance to change are essential parts of the therapeutic process. In this
connection, it is important to understand the kinds of persuasion and pressure
that patients perceive as coercive and offensive and those that they perceive as
noncoercive and acceptable. Moreover, it is important to understand the relationship between these patient perceptions of coercion and noncoercion and
therapeutic success or failure.

58. WINIcK, supra note 14, at 363-68; Jeffrie G. Murphy, Total Institutions and the Possibility of Consent to Organic Therapies 5 HuM. RTS. Q. 25, 38 (1975); David B. Wexler, Reflections on the Legal Regulation of Behavior Modification in Institutional Settings, 17 ARIz. L. REV.
132, 133 (1975).
59. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 758. Compare Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 265 (1973),
and McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970), with Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S.
213, 215 (1973).
60. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 758; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 241-44 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969); Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
61. See WINICK, supra note 14, at 371-89.
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Even when mandatory treatment or hospitalization is permitted by the law,
it is important for both legal actors and clinicians involved in the treatment
process to understand when patients subjectively perceive coercion, and the
relationship between such perceptions and treatment outcome. Because the
purpose of treatment delivered on an involuntary basis is to ameliorate the
patient's psychopathology, it is crucial to inquire concerning what kinds of
persuasion and pressure are conducive to the therapeutic mission and those
which may undermine it. Legal actors and clinicians functioning within the
coercive treatment context should therefore view the question of coercion
through the lens of therapeutic jurisprudence.62
Therapeutic jurisprudence is the study of the law as a therapeutic agent.
Whether we appreciate it or not, the law is a social force that frequently imposes therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences on the people it affects.
Therapeutic jurisprudence is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of law
that calls for a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of law on
individuals' psychological health and functioning. By examining law in this
way, therapeutic jurisprudence can generate a wide array of empirical and policy issues, many of which have not previously been raised, that can enrich our
understanding of law and identify new and creative law reform proposals.63
Law's therapeutic consequences are not the only ones worth studying or considering, of course, but they should not be neglected in any sensible policy
analysis of law. When legal rules or procedures or the roles played by various
legal actors (such as judges, lawyers, and clinicians) create antitherapeutic
consequences, we should consider whether changes in law or in the way law is
applied can be accomplished in a manner that will minimize these consequences consistent with considerations of justice and other relevant normative values.
Applying the therapeutic jurisprudence approach to the context of coercive
mental health treatment allows us to identify a number of issues that are ripe
for empirical research, the results of which will be crucial to legal decision
making in this area. When the law permits coercive treatment in various contexts, it does so based on the assumption that such treatment is effective. But
is such treatment effective when imposed coercively? Can coercion impose
negative effects on the treatment process? How should clinicians deal with
their patients when coercive treatment is authorized? How can legal rules
permitting coercive treatment be structured in order to further and not diminish
the potential for a successful treatment outcome? Even in the absence of empirical research on these issues, the need exists to apply psychological theory
to speculate about the effects of coercion in the mental health process. The

62. See generally DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1991) (analyzing and illustrating law's role as a therapeutic agent); LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J.

Winick eds., 1996) (illustrating application of therapeutic jurisprudence to a wide spectrum of
legal issues and containing commentary on this emerging approach to legal policy analysis) [hereinafter LAW INA THERAPEUTIC KEY]; WINCK, supra note 3 (applying the approach of therapeutic
jurisprudence to analyze the field of mental health law); Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudenceof
TherapeuticJurisprudence,3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. (forthcoming 1997).
63. See LAW IN A THERAPEUrIC KEY, supra note 62 (anthology of therapeutic jurisprudence
of theoretical and empirical work on a wide variety of legal issues).
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remainder of this article will address these issues, conducting a therapeutic
jurisprudence analysis of legal and clinical approaches to coercive treatment.
The first question for analysis is whether coercive treatment works.
V. DoEs CoERcIvE TREATMENT WORK?

To the extent that the law permits involuntary treatment in order to improve mental health or restore a level of functional capacity, there is a need
for social scientists to examine whether the law's objectives are accomplished.
There have been various anecdotal reports of successful treatment in coercive
situations. ' There is a paucity of empirical research exploring the efficacy of
involuntary treatment, however.' An extensive review of the literature on
psychotherapy and psychotropic medication, the two most prevalent forms of
treatment for those suffering from mental illness, found no persuasive evidence that coercive application of these two techniques to involuntarily committed patients was effective.' In recent years, there has been increased interest in the efficacy of aggressive community-based treatment.6' Several researchers have conducted quasi-experimental studies of outpatient civil commitment, and have concluded that it is effective in reducing the length and
number of hospitalizations, and in increasing patient continuance in treatment.' These studies, however, are preliminary and suffer from serious
methodological difficulties-small sample sizes, use of retrospective data, lack
of control groups, and failure to control for potential confounding variables,
including the selection criteria used and the effects of informal coercion.'
Some of these methodological difficulties may be inherent to the task of
studying the efficacy of coerced treatment. A true experiment employing random assignment of patients thought to be in need of coerced treatment raises
ethical dilemmas and may not be feasible."0 Moreover, there is lack of agreement concerning proper outcome measures for judging the efficacy of treatment. For example, such factors as rehospitalization or recidivism, or increased continuation in treatment, may not adequately capture the effectiveness
of treatment.

64.

GROUP FOR THE ADvANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, FORCED INTO TREATMENT: THE ROLE

OF COERCION IN CLINICAL PRACTICE 22-24, 81, 99-101 (1994) (including anecdotal reports of
successful treatment in coercive situations, including treatment of children and adolescents, sex
offenders, and employees treated for alcoholism or drug addiction when coercion is perceived by
patient as fair and appropriate).
65. Phyllis Solomon, Research on the Coercion of Persons with Severe Mental Illness, in A
NEW FRONTIER, supra note 4, at 129, 142-43.
66. Mary L. Durham & John Q. La Fond, A Search for the Missing Premise of Involuntary
Therapeutic Commitment: Effective Treatment of the Mentally Ill, 40 RIrGERs L. REv. 303, 35156, 367-68 (1988).
67. A NEW FRONTIER, supranote 4, at 2-3.
68. 'See, e.g., Virginia A. Hiday & Theresa L. Scheid-Cook, A Follow-Up of Chronic Patients Committed to Outpatient Treatment, 40 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 52 (1989); Rob-

ert A. Van Putten et al., Involuntary Outpatient Commitment in Arizona: A Retrospective Study, 39
HosP. & CoMMuNIrY PsYCHIATRY 953 (1988); Guido Zanni & Leslie de Veau, Inpatient Stays
Before and After Outpatient Commitment, 37 HOsP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 941 (1986).
69. Solomon, supra note 65, at 135; M.S. Swartz et al., New Directions in Research on Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, 46 HOsP. & COMMUNrrY PSYCHIATRY 381, 382 (1995).
70. Monahan et al., supra note 8.
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VI. THE PERCEPTION OF COERCION

We thus know very little about the efficacy of coerced treatment. More
research plainly is needed.7 However, before we can properly study coercion
as an independent variable in treatment outcome, a significant prior issue must
be examined-coercion as a dependent variable, that is, what makes people
feel coerced." As indicated earlier, the concept of coercion has a significant
subjective component. " The issue of when people feel coerced-the determininants and correlates of perceived coercion-has been the subject of important
recent research conducted under the auspices of the MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health and the Law.74 This research examined attitudes of
patients at the time of admission to mental hospitals. The preliminary results
indicated that patient perceptions of coercion do not necessarily correlate with
whether they have been subjected to formal legal compulsion, such as occurs
in civil commitment, and that it is possible to study patients' perceptions of
coercion independent of the formal legal status of voluntary or involuntary
admission."
The MacArthur coercion study concluded that a number of important
variables correlated with patient perceptions of coercion.76 One of these was
the motivation of the clinician or state actor-the extent to which the treatment provider was perceived as acting out of concern for the patient's wellbeing. Another was respect--the degree of respect with which the treatment
provider dealt with the patient. Others included what in the psychology of
procedural justice has come to be known as voice-the extent to which the
patient was afforded an opportunity to express his or her opinion on the admission decision-and validation-the extent to which what the patient had to
say was taken seriously.' Patients desire to be included in the process of determining whether they will be admitted to the hospital, and experience coercion to the extent they are excluded from that process.

71. Solomon, supra note 65.
72. A NEW FRONTIER, supra note 4, at 14; Bennett et al., supra note 8; Gardner et al., supra
note 8.
73. See supra Part I.
74. A NEW FRONTIER, supra note 4; Bennett et al., supra note 8, at 297-99; Gardner et al.,
supra note 8.
75. A NEW FRONTIER, supra note 4; Lidz et al., supra note 6.
76. A NEW FRoNTIER, supra note 4.
77. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 26-34 (1988); JOHN TIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Hiday et al., supra
note 8, at 229-30, Stephen LaTour, Determinants of Participationand Observer Satisfaction with
Adversary and Inquisitorial Modes of Adjudication, 36 J. PERSONALrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1531
(1978); E. Allan Lind et al., Procedure and Outcome Effects on Reactions to Adjudicated Resolutions of Conflicts of Interest, '39 J. PERSONALrrY & SoC. PSYCHOL. 643, 652-53 (1980); E. Allan
Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns
in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL 952 (1990); Norman G. Poythress,
Procedural Preferences, Perceptions of Fairness, and Compliance with Outcomes, 18 LAW &
Hum. BEHAv. 361 (1994); John Thibaut et al., ProceduralJustice as Fairness,26 STAN. L. REv.
1271 (1974); Tom R. Tyler, The PsychologicalConsequences of JudicialProcedures:Implications
for Civil Commitment Hearings,46 SMU L. REV. 433, (1992); see also Tom E. Hughes & Lon N.
Larson, PatientInvolvement in Health Care: A ProceduralJustice Viewpoint, 29 MED. CARE 297
(1991).
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Another important variable was the patient's perception of fairness-whether he or she was treated fairly and whether trickery or deception
was used in the admission process. Finally, the extent to which pressure was
applied in the admission process was deemed significant, that is, the degree of
persuasion, inducement, threats, or force. Very high levels of perceived coercion were present when treatment providers used the negative pressures of
threats and force, whereas positive approaches involving persuasion and inducement were associated with no increase in perceived coercion.78
Patients in the admissions process who reported that others acted out of
concern for them, treated them fairly, in good faith, with respect, and without
deception, provided them with an opportunity for voice, and took what they
said seriously were much less likely to experience coercion.79 When these
moral norms reflecting patient attitudes about how they should be treated are
adhered to, many apparently coercive acts seem to be accepted by the patient
as morally legitimate. 0 In any future research on the efficacy of coercive
treatment, these findings must be taken into account in designing studies to
measure the relationship between perceived coercion and treatment outcome.
But they also should be taken into account in considering how clinicians
should act toward their patients in involuntary hospitalization and treatment
contexts.
VII.

BALANCING THE

POsrrIVE

AND NEGATIVE EFFEcTs OF COERCION

To the extent that coercive treatment is effective, it must count, of course,
as a positive therapeutic consequence of legal rules permitting coerced treatment. At least in some circumstances, coercion can improve the quality (or at
least stability) of a client's life.' Undoubtedly some patients who otherwise
would reject treatment needed to reduce suffering and promote healthy
functioning may benefit immensely from treatment provided on an involuntary
basis.
Against these potentially positive effects of coercive treatment, however,
must be weighed its potentially negative consequences. Patients may experience feelings of alienation and disaffection if they feel improperly coerced,
with potentially negative effects on treatment compliance and efficacy. 2 Even
if patients comply with treatment when coerced to do so, long-range therapeutic outcomes may become tenuous because patients may be unlikely to adhere
voluntarily to needed medication or psychosocial therapy once coercive conditions are removed. 3 Treatment imposed over objection reveals a failure of
the therapeutic relationship that can produce negative effects on the therapeutic
process that may be long-lasting. 4 Moreover, if coerced treatment is permit-

78. A NEW FRONTIER, supra note 4, at 23.
79. Id. at 24.
80. Bennett et al., supra note 8, at 304.
81. Diamond, supra note 11, at 59-60.
82. A NEw FROrmIR, supra note 4, at 14; Bennett et al., supra note 8, at 296; Hiday et al.,
supra note 8, at 237-38; Rogers, supra note 8.
83. Hiday et al., supra note 8. at 237-38.
84. Andrea K. Blanch & Jacqueline Parrish, Reports of Three Roundtable Discussionson In-
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ted, the patient, as well as other patients, might be deterred from seeking
treatment voluntarily out of fear that they might be committed. 5 Indeed,
studies show that fear of involuntary hospitalization has kept patients from
seeking treatment voluntarily at least once when they thought it was needed. 6
Because coercion diminishes and sometimes even negates choice, a therapeutic jurisprudence analysis of coercive treatment should probe the relationship between patient choice and therapeutic outcome. My own theoretical
work on the psychology of choice suggests the existence of considerable psychological value in allowing individuals to exercise choice concerning a wide
variety of matters, including decisions affecting their health. 7 Treatment imposed over objection may not work as well. In general, unless people themselves see the merits of achieving a particular goal, they often do not pursue it
or do so without the degree of commitment necessary to attain it.
Research in the area of medical treatment generally suggests that when
physicians do not allow patients to participate in treatment decisions and do
not explain treatment to them, patients often do not comply with medical advice. 8 In general, treatment adherence increases when the patient is given
choice and the ability to participate in the selection of treatment alternatives
and goals.89 Coerced hospitalization and treatment may make it less likely
that the client will be willing to stay connected with the treatment system or
continue to take medication after discharge from the hospital.' ° When patients
exercise choice in matters of treatment, this may bring a degree of commitment, which mobilizes the self-evaluative and self-reinforcing mechanisms that
facilitate goal achievement.91 A patient given the freedom to refuse hospitalization or treatment has a corresponding ability to choose to accept it. To
the extent that a patient's agreement to accept a course of treatment recom-

voluntary Interventions, 1 PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT MONOGRAPH

1 (1993); Diamond, supra note 11, at 61; see also DONALD MEICHENBAUM & DENNIS C. TURK,
FACILITATING TREATMENT ADHERENCE: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE-BOOK 20, 76-79 (1987); Hiday

et al., supra note 8, at 236.
85. LAw IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 62, at 146-47; A NEw FRONTIER, supra note 4,
at 14; Monahan et al., supra note 8.
86. Hiday et al., supra note 8, at 236; Lidz et al., supra note 6; Alicia Lucksted & Robert D.
Coursey, Consumer Perceptions of Pressure and Force in Psychiatric Treatments, 46 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 146 (1995);

87. WINICK, supra note 3, at 87-91; WiNICK, supra note 14, at 327-44; Winick, supra note
17 at 46-52; Winick, supra note 4; Bruce J. Winick, The MacArthur Treatment Competency
Study: Legal and Therapeutic Implications, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 137 (1996); Bruce J.
Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1755-68
(1992).
88.

PAUL S. APPELBAUM Er AL., INFORMED CONSENT. LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACsupra note 84, at 20, 76-79; BILL D. MOYERS, HEALING
AND THE MIND 50 (1993); see Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Gutheil, Drug Refusal: A Study of
TICE 28 (1987); MEICHENBAUM & TURK,

PsychiatricInpatients, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 340, 341 (1980).
89. MEICHENBAUM & TURK, supra note 84, at 157, 159, 175; Fredrick H. Kanfer & Lisa
Gaelick, Self-Management Methods, in HELPING PEOPLE CHANGE 334-47 (Fredrick H. Kanfer &
Arnold P. Goldstein eds., 1986).
90. Diamond, supra note 11, at 63.
91. ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND ACTION: A SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY 338, 363, 368, 468-69, 470-71, 475-76, 478-79 (1986); SHARON S. BREHM &
JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL 301

(1981); MEICHENBAUM & TURK, supra note 84, at 156-57; Carroll, supra note 2, at 137-38.

1997]

COERCION AND MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT

1161

mended by a therapist constitutes an affirmative expression of choice by the
patient in favor of treatment, such choice itself may be therapeutic. Compli92
ance with a treatment regimen may be indispensable to treatment success.
Yet compliance may be negatively correlated with coercion.
For many types of mental health treatment in particular, the effectiveness
of treatment "is proportional to the degree of cooperation that is present..... ."'Several strands of psychological theory help to explain why patient choice in treatment decision making is likely to increase treatment efficacy. A conscious, voluntary agreement to accept a course of treatment constitutes the setting of a goal. The goal-setting effect, a well-accepted psychological principle, posits that the setting of explicit goals is itself a significant factor in their achievement.94 Indeed, the setting of a goal may be indispensable
to the achievement of change. 9 When patients voluntarily agree to treatment
recommended by a therapist, their agreement constitutes the setting of a goal
that both they and their therapist predict can and will be accomplished. The
setting of a goal that seems achievable sets up expectancies of success that
themselves help to bring about favorable treatment outcomes.' Predictions
and expectations of goal achievement stimulate feelings of self-efficacy in the
patient, which in turn spark action and effort in furtherance of the goal.'
Psychological theory therefore would support the prediction that choice in
matters of treatment and hospitalization will work better than coercion. Selfdetermination promotes commitment, intrinsic motivation, satisfaction, and
effective functioning.98 By contrast, if the individual feels coerced to accept
hospitalization or treatment that is not truly desired, motivation to succeed is
likely to be reduced. Indeed, imposing treatment over objection may produce
feelings of resentment and psychological reactance that reduce patient compliance and the likelihood of treatment success. 99
A persistent criticism of the mental hospital is that it fosters a form of

92. MEICHENBAUM & TURK, supra note 84.
93. Council of the Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Position Statement on the Question of Adequacy
of Treatment, 123 Am.J. PSYCHIATRY 1458, 1459 (1967).
94. Donald J. Campbell, The Effects of Goal-Contingent Payment on the Performance of a
Complex Task, 37 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 23, 23 (1984); Vandra L. Huber, Comparison of Monetary Reinforcers and Goal Setting as Learning Incentives, 56 PsYCHOL. REP. 223 (1985); Daniel
S. Kirschenbaum & Randall C. Flanery, Toward a Psychology of BehavioralContracting, 4 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REv. 598, 603-09 (1984); Edwin A. Locke etal., Goal Setting and Task Performance 1969-80, 90 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 125, 125-31 (1981); James R. Terborg & Howard E. Miller,
Motivation, Behavior, and Performance: A Closer Examination of Goal Setting and Monetary
Incentives, 63 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 29, 30-31 (1978).
95. BANDURA, supra note 91, at 469.
96. Id. at 412-13, 467; Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The Empirical Exploration of
Intrinsic Motivational Processes, 13 ADVANCEs IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 39, 59 (1980).
97. BANDURA, supra note 91, at 413; Albert Bandura, Self-Efficacy: Toward a Unifying
Theory of Behavior Change, 84 PSYCHOL. REv. 191 (1977).
98. EDWARD L. DECI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 208-10 (1980); see also
CHARLES A. KIESLER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COMMITMENT: EXPERIMENTS LINKING BEHAVIOR TO

BELIEF
desired
trol).
99.
BREHM,

164-67 (1971) (finding that the most effective method for behavior therapists to obtain
results with patients was to give patients the perception that they had freedom and conJACK W. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE (1966); BREHM &
supra note 91, at 300-01.
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institutional dependence that may prevent future adjustment in the community."° Mental hospitals too often have conditioned passivity and helplessness
by reinforcing it and by discouraging assertiveness and autonomous behavior.
Mental patients have been infantilized by the treatment they received from
institutional clinicians and staff. Treating patients as incompetent objects of
paternalism may strongly reinforce feelings of incompetency and hopelessness,
destroying intrinsic motivation and feelings of self-efficacy, and even producing the syndrome of learned helplessness.'"' When decisions that significantly affect the individual, such as those relating to treatment, are made by others
without the individual's participation, the resulting disuse of decision-making
powers may lead to further degeneration of existing capabilities and behaviors."'2 Coercion undermines feelings of self-efficacy, which may be essential
to the recovery process.' °3
Treating patients as incompetent to make hospitalization or treatment decisions for themselves, which legal rules that permit coercion rather than requiring voluntary choice reinforce, therefore actually may promote psychological dysfunction. Exercising self-determination is a basic human need."°
Studies show that allowing individuals to make decisions for themselves is
intrinsically motivating, whereas denying choice "undermines [their] motivation, learning, and general sense of organismic well-being.""' 5 Indeed, the
stress of losing the opportunity to be self-determining may cause "severe somatic malfunction and even death.""'6 For a number of reasons, therefore,
coercion may produce dysfunctional effects and other antitherapeutic consequences.
The above analysis of the psychological value of voluntary choice and the
potentially dysfunctional and countertherapeutic effects of coercion, although
consistent with much clinical experience, is based largely on principles of
psychological theory derived from studies with more "normal" populations.
More research is needed concerning the effects of choice and coercion on
treatment outcome. This is particularly true for individuals suffering from serious mental illness, such as schizophrenia. A patient in a florid state of schizophrenia, for example, who is disoriented and hallucinating, may not possess a
sufficient degree of competence to make a meaningful choice in favor of treat-

100. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF
MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 3-74 (1962); CHARLES A. KIESLER & AMY E. SIBULKIN,
MENTAL HosPrrAIzATION: MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT A NATIONAL CRISIS 148 (1987); WINICK,
supra note 2, at 35 n.81; Richard Cole, Patients' Rights vs. Doctors' Rights: Which Should Take
Precedence?, in REFUSING TREATMENT IN MENTAL INSTITUTIONS: VALUES IN CONFLICr 59 (A.
Edward Doudera & Judith P. Swazey eds., 1982); Edmund G. Doherty, Labeling Effects in Psychiatric Hospitalization:A Study of Diverging Patterns of Inpatient Self-Labeling Process, 32 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 562 (1975).
101. ELLEN J. LANGER, MINDFULNESS 53 (1989); MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS:
ON DEPRESSION, DEvELOPMENT AND DEATH (1975); HUMAN HELPLESSNESS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (Judy Garber & Martin E.P. Seligman eds., 1980); WINICK, supra note 3, at 28-36.

102.

Bruce D. Sales & Lynn R. Kahle, Law and Attitudes Toward the Mentally Ill, 3 INT'L

J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 391, 392 (1980).
103. Diamond, supra note 11, at 61-63; Solomon, supra note 65, at 143.
104. DECI, supra note 98, at 208-09.
105. Id. at 209.
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mentY.' How much understanding and volition are necessary to engage the
psychological mechanisms discussed earlier that can contribute to positive
treatment response? Will choice by such a patient have the effect of producing
the positive expectancies and intrinsic motivation that seem to be related to
favorable treatment outcome? Because theoretical explanations for the relationship between patient choice and treatment success are based on studies
with significantly less impaired populations, we should ask whether these
findings can be generalized to more impaired patients suffering from at least
severe cases of major mental illness. These questions remain largely unexamined empirically.
Even if many patients suffering from mental illness do not possess sufficient competence to enable their choices to trigger these positive psychological
effects, however, allowing them as great a degree of choice as circumstances
permit may still be therapeutic. The aim of treatment interventions for acutely
psychotic patients is to ameliorate severe symptomatology and restore the
patient to as great a degree of competence as is possible. After a brief period
of medication, for example, most seriously disturbed patients will be sufficiently competent that their choices about future treatment presumably will
have positive therapeutic value. Even if coercion is necessary for a patient
suffering acute symptoms, whose mental illness might prevent rational decision making about treatment and who otherwise would refuse it, once the patient can participate in decision making and experience the psychological value
of making treatment choices, the justifications for coercion will cease. Even
when the law allows clinicians to impose treatment coercively, they should
proceed in a manner that is sensitive to the psychological value of allowing
patients to exercise the maximum degree of decision-making authority of
which they are capable. Although there are situations in which coercive treatment may be both legally permissible and therapeutically appropriate, clinicians should be aware that too much coercion, and coercion applied after it is
no longer necessary, may be antitherapeutic.
Apart from the psychological value of allowing patients to participate in
treatment decision making to the maximum extent to which they are capable,
legal rules in this area will have an inevitable effect on the therapist-patient
relationship in ways that itself can have either positive or negative therapeutic
consequences."n Will legal rules permitting coercive treatment be more or
less conducive to the therapeutic mission of the therapeutic relationship than
those that require the patients' voluntary informed consent? How should therapists act in regard to the issue of coercive treatment so as to maximize the
professional relationship's potential as a therapeutic agent in its own right?
There is increasing recognition that, at least in psychotherapy, the therapeutic relationship itself plays an essential role in producing positive out-

107. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (finding patient with schizophrenia assenting to voluntary admission to hospital incompetent to consent to hospitalization). For a detailed
analysis of Zinermon and of the concept of competence to consent to voluntary hospitalization, see
Winick, supra note 17.
108. See WINICK, supra note 3, at 83-90 (discussing effect of a right to refuse treatment on
the therapeutic relationship); WINICK, supra note 14, at 338-42.
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comes.' The effectiveness of psychotherapy is heavily dependent on the
quality of the therapeutic relationship. " ° The most effective therapeutic relationships are those in which mutual trust and acceptance are established and
maintained, and in which the patient perceives that the therapist cares about
and is committed to pursuing his or her interests."' Patients improve as a result of therapeutic relationships that generate the perception that the therapist
is interested in and dedicated to the patient's well-being." To succeed, the
therapist must establish his or her credibility and trustworthiness at an early
time in the relationship. A relationship in which the therapist is permitted to
treat the patient as an object of paternalism whose participation in therapeutic
decision making is unnecessary and undesirable will not inspire such trust and
confidence and therefore may be counterproductive. Indeed, a relationship in
which the therapist ignores the patient's expressed wishes concerning treatment may produce the perception that the therapist is more concerned with the
welfare of the institution than with that of the patient, and is not truly committed to the patient's best interest. Rather than producing trust and confidence, a coercive approach by the therapist, particularly if not perceived as benevolently motivated, can inspire resentment and resistance.
Therapists, particularly those in public institutions, too often seem to
misperceive the importance of the therapist-patient relationship. Not only do
these therapists thereby forego therapeutic opportunities, but by their actions
they may actually create a harmful division between therapist and patient. Too
often, there is not a real connection or sense of community between therapist
and patient. As a result, no real sense of trust and confidence develops on the
part of the patient. Yet such trust and confidence may be a prerequisite for
engaging those positive attitudes and expectancies that play an important role
in producing a successful treatment response. The therapist-patient relationship
is especially important in the context of psychotherapy, but it also may play a
significant role in all areas of medical practice. "'
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Legal rules that broadly authorize coercive treatment will shape the therapist-patient relationship quite differently from those that generally require voluntary and informed consent. Legal rules requiring voluntariness will inevitably increase the likelihood that therapists will respect the dignity and autonomy of their patients, and recognize their essential role in the therapeutic process. Legal rules emphasizing voluntariness compared to those that broadly
authorize coercion can reshape the therapists' role so as to increase the potential for a true therapeutic alliance in which therapists treat their patients as
persons."' The result can be more patient trust, confidence, and participation
in decision making in ways that can cause patients to internalize treatment
goals. A therapeutic relationship that stresses voluntariness--one in which the
patient sees the therapist as his agent, assisting him to accomplish goals that
the two of them define-rather than as a paternalistic director of the process
or as the agent of the institution in which the patient is held-is more likely to
create the atmosphere of trust and openness that is necessary for the therapeutic relationship to bring about healing and change.
A legal system in which the therapist needs the informed and voluntary
consent of the patient is thus more conducive to allowing the relationship itself
to realize its potential as a therapeutic agent. An informed consent requirement, by encouraging a therapist-patient dialogue, can create a significant
therapeutic opportunity. Discussion and negotiation about a patient's objections
to treatment can provide an important context for probing conscious and unconscious resistance, for forming a positive transference, and for earning the
patient's trust and confidence." 5
These considerations favoring therapeutic relationships based on
voluntariness rather than coercion obviously have special force in the context
of verbal psychotherapy." 6 They also seem applicable, however, in the context of behavior therapy, many of the techniques of which, in order to succeed,
require patient cooperation and involvement as well as trust and confidence in
the therapist. "' Moreover, although to a considerably lesser extent, these
considerations may apply as well even in the context of administration of
psychotropic medication."' Choosing the appropriate medication, for example, and maximizing the potential that it will be used appropriately, will often
require communication with the patient and a high degree of cooperation." 9
In addition, psychotropic drugs are not administered in isolation, but are part
of an integrated treatment program that involves verbal psychotherapy as well
as psychosocial therapy approaches. Even if psychotropic medication would be
effective in reducing severe symptomatology when administered coercively,

with "a low sense of control [are] significantly associated with (1) less self-initiated preventive
care; (2) less optimism concerning the efficacy of early trealment; (3) poorer self-rated health; and
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118. See id. at 61-85 (discussing psychotropic medication).
119. Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra note 88, at 341.

1166

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:4

the verbal therapy that should follow the reduction in symptoms would seem
to be more effective to the extent that the individual chooses it voluntarily.
Whatever the treatment approach, therefore, allowing the patient to exercise
choice will predictably enrich and improve the quality of the treatment decision-making process and the treatment program."' Successful treatment planning and implementation require a thorough analysis of the patient's problems,
of the social context that often perpetuates them. and of the patient's strengths
and weaknesses. Patient trust, cooperation, and full and open communication
are essential if the therapist is to obtain this information from the patient.
For several reasons, therefore, involuntary hospitalization and coercively
imposed treatment may have antitherapeutic effects. Voluntary approaches in
general would seem more conducive to long-range treatment success and to
greater patient satisfaction. Although empirical investigation is needed to further explore the relationship between coercion and treatment outcome, a considerable body of theoretical work supports much clinical experience suggesting that coercion does not work as well as treatment undertaken voluntarily.
VII.

APPLYING THE LAW THERAPEUTICALLY IN COERCIVE CONTEXTS

Although there undoubtedly are situations in which a degree of coercion is
both therapeutically appropriate and legally acceptable, clinicians should use
coercion sparingly and involve the patient in the decision-making process to
the fullest extent possible. Even when coercion is necessary, clinicians should
seek to apply it in ways that minimize the patient's perception of coercion. In
this respect, the research on coercion performed under the auspices of the
MacArthur Research Network for Mental Health and the Law described earlier
has special significance.'.
Although empirical research has not as yet extensively probed the relationship between the perception of coercion and treatment outcome, the theoretical analysis contained in this article strongly suggests that patients who feel
coerced do not respond as well as those who do not feel coerced. Therefore,
clinicians who find it necessary to impose treatment coercively should heed
the admonitions of the MacArthur research and interact with their patients in
ways that minimize patients' subjective perceptions of coercion even though,
in an objective sense, coercion is being applied The MacArthur research suggests that positive approaches such as persuasion be used as a strategy of
choice to attempt to convince people to accept treatment. 2 Negative approaches such as threats should be used "only as a last resort to secure needed
care. '"'2 Furthermore, in all circumstances (but especially when negative
pressure has been used), patients should be given a sense of inclusion in the
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hospital admission and treatment decision making processes and afforded as
much process--"voice" and "validation"--as possible." 4 Clinicians should
convey to their patients the notion that they are acting out of concern for their
well-being. They should treat their patients fairly, with respect and without
deception, give them an opportunity to tell their side of the story, and seriously consider their views in the hospitalization and treatment decision-making
processes.'" Clinicians finding it necessary to impose treatment coercively
who heed these admonitions can thereby minimize the risk that coercion will
have antitherapeutic effects.
IX. CONCLUSION

Coercion may sometimes be necessary, particularly in the treatment of
severely ill patients. However, in light of the potential antitherapeutic consequences of coercion, clinicians should resort to it only when truly necessary
and should involve the patient in the hospital admission and treatment decision-making processes to the greatest extent possible. As soon as coerced
treatment has had the hoped-for effects, the clinician should cede to the patient
increasing measures of treatment decision-making autonomy. Whenever possible, clinicians should use persuasion, education, negotiation, and inducement in
preference to coercion, threats, negative pressure, and deception. Even when
coercion is deemed necessary, clinicians should act toward their patients in
ways that minimize the perception of coercion and maximize the patient's
sense of voice and inclusion and the patient's appreciation that the treatment
imposed is benevolently motivated and administered in good faith.
While more research is needed on the issue of the effectiveness of coercive treatment, we know enough to reshape clinical practice in the imposition
of involuntary hospitalization and treatment to reduce coercion's
antitherapeutic consequences. In defining "coercion" for legal purposes, and in
specifying the procedural due process protections that must be accorded before
coercion may be applied, the law also should take these findings into account.
The civil commitment hearing and hearings relating to involuntary treatment,
for example, should be reshaped to foster patient perceptions that involuntary
hospitalization or treatment is being proposed by clinicians for benevolent reasons and to provide the patient with a sense of "voice" and participation.'26
Involuntary hospitalization and treatment can be structured and implemented in
ways that permit many patients to "feel like they have voice and validation"
and to "avoid force even in the absence of choice.""' Even when hearings
may not be required as a matter of procedural due process, there may be therapeutic value in providing them as a means of increasing patient perception of
choice and participation in treatment decision making, with likely positive
therapeutic effect.'28 "The challenge is to try to extend to all patients at the
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time of their admission [or involuntary treatment] a demonstration in word and
action that they are persons with opinions, desires, rights and dignity, and not
just mental patients in an acute crisis." 29 Even when a hearing seems pointless because the criteria for involuntary hospitalization or treatment seem
clearly met, the process values of providing patients with "voice", and their
likely impact on therapeutic response, alone argue for affording the patient a
hearing.' 3
Apart from legal rules governing coercion and the application of coercive
treatment and hospitalization, the codes of professional ethics of clinicians
engaging in the treatment process should also reflect these insights. Because
such professional ethics are based on principles of beneficence and
nonmalfeasance,' 3 ' clinicians should recognize that the way they act in applying the authority that the law may give them has an inevitable impact on
the health and welfare of their patients and the clinical professions should
develop appropriate guidelines in this area.
Legal rules governing coercion should protect individual autonomy regarding matters that vitally affect the individual, including health care decision
making. Individual autonomy is at the root of our political and philosophical
traditions," 2 but in addition, the psychological value of self-determination
should help to shape law and policy in this area."' Although autonomy and
therapeutic values may at times conflict, they often will converge. To achieve
the full promise of individual autonomy, legal rules and clinical practices
relating to involuntary hospitalization and coercive mental health treatment
thus should reflect a therapeutic jurisprudence orientation.
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